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 I n this study, we investigate the dynamics of the trilateral trade relationship among the U.S., Japan 
and an emerging economy in the Pacific Basin.    Our particular attention is paid to two emerging 
countries; China and Mexico.  In what we call the “triangular trade approach,” we explore how 
Japanese trade with and foreign direct investment to an emerging economy affect its exports to the 
US market.  We apply the trilateral trade approach to eight Southeast Asian countries, four 
American continent countries and four European countries.  Our empirical results suggest that 
the exports of China and Mexico are directly competing with those of Japan in US markets while 
the exports of China and Mexico to the US also appears to be promoted partly by Japanese exports 
to these countries. However, after controlling for Japan’s FDI to these countries, the trade 
enhancing effect of Japanese exports disappears for China, leading us to conclude that Japanese 
exports to China are positively correlated with Chinese exports to the US through an increase in 
vertical trade between Japanese multinationals and their affiliates in China. Our results indicate 
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 1. Introduction 
  The Pacific Basin contains two regions of emerging economies, namely, 
Southeast Asian countries and Latin American countries.  From the perspective of 
development economics, researchers can easily find many features making these two 
regions distinct from each other.  Variety of languages are much more broad in 
Southeast Asia, the size of land is enormous for Latin American countries whereas 
population is much more dense in Southeast Asian countries and differences can be 
found in education levels, natural resources endowments, income per capita and so on. 
  In an era of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and free trade agreements 
(FTAs) in bilateral and multilateral relationships, however, the most important feature 
of these regions might be the geographical location of regions with respect to two largest 
economies of the world, the U.S. and Japan.  While both the U.S. and Japan are the 
biggest producers of the world, coupled with its huge external imbalance, the U.S. is 
definitely the largest market in the world. 
  In search for a location of overseas production, two options can be available; a 
location closer to home country or a location closer to a targeted market.  From the 
perspective of Japanese multinationals, establishing a subsidiary plant in the 
Southeast Asia reduce transportation cost for shipments of intermediate products 
between a parent firm and subsidiaries while a plant in the Latin America can cut 
transportation costs between subsidiaries and final consumers in the U.S.1 
  From the wake of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico-US 
trade has expanded and brought down transportation cost for crossing national borders 
                                                  
1  Reduction in cost is not limited to transportation cost.    For example, shortening of 
communication and shipment time can also save possible missed opportunities.   
However, again, there is a trade-off between proximity to home and proximity to 
market.   3
of these countries, see the arguments in Hanson (2001).  One extreme case of 
minimizing distance between subsidiary and final market is to establish a local plant in 
a country of final market, i.e., the U.S. in this case.  However, coupled with lower 
wages of Mexican labor force, diminishing transportation cost between Mexico and the 
U.S. is appealing.   
  In this study our focus is to investigate the dynamics of exports for emerging 
economies in the Pacific Basin with respect to the U.S. market.  Particularly, we 
investigate how Japanese exports and foreign direct investments (FDIs) to emerging 
economies of two regions affect exports of emerging economies to the U.S.  With 
ongoing expansion of outsourcing and fragmentation of vertical production in 
international settings, export platform FDIs by Japanese multinationals surely boost 
trade volume of emerging economies.  Aside from FDIs’ direct effect, an export of 
Japanese products to emerging economies can itself promote an export of emerging 
economies when spillover technologies and competitive pressure for import substitute 
industries are considered.  In addition to Japanese exports and FDIs with respect to 
emerging economies, we also include Japanese direct export to the U.S. to control for 
production shift effect and substitution effect2. 
  In our sample we compare eight Asian countries with four American Continent 
countries and also include four European countries for robustness check, besides the US 
and Japan.  For the reminder of the paper, we sometimes refer a country other than 
the US and Japan as a “third-country” for convenience.  With the trade data 
disaggregated at the HS 4-digit level, the exports of a third country to the US are 
regressed on the Japanese exports to the US as well as those to the third (exporting) 
                                                  
2  These frameworks are called ‘Triangular Trade Approach” in Ito and Yoshida (2005). 
Through descriptions of these effects are provided in section 3.   4
country in a panel data specification while controlling for other macro economic 
variables.  With this model specification, the dynamics of the triangular trade 
relationships among the US, Japan, and a third country can be examined.  More 
specifically, it can be revealed whether Japanese exports to the U.S. are in a substitute 
(competitive) or complementary relationship with those of a third country, while the 
former case possibly signifying Japanese multinational corporations’ shift in their 
production bases. 
  One contribution of our paper in empirical international trade literature is that 
we attempt to estimate bilateral trade in a three-country framework whereas most of 
empirical works on international trade considers bilateral trade in a two-country 
framework.  Empirical studies of bilateral trades using a gravity model framework 
implicitly ignore a possibly significant source of trade determinants, namely a third 
country.  In addition our framework can shed a new light to the role of ‘distance’ in 
international trade.    Distance is used as a measure for trade cost between an exporting 
country and an importing country in gravity model.  Distance in our framework can 
take two measures; distance from Japan and distance from US.  Whereas distance 
from US measures proximity to the market, distance from Japan can be interpreted as 
proximity to a competing country or proximity of production plants in a vertical relation. 
  The main empirical results are as follows:  First, we obtained the empirical 
results that export of Japan to China is promoting Chinese exports to the US.    However, 
after controlling for FDI, trade enhancing effect of Japanese export to China disappears.   
This result strongly supports the view that Japanese export to China is promoting 
Chinese exports to US due to the shift of production plants to China.  Second, in 
contrast to China, both Japanese export to Mexico and FDI are significantly positive for 
Mexican export to US.  Japanese export to Mexico has some enhancement effect on   5
Mexican export to US in addition to Japanese-FDI related exports.  Moreover, we also 
found that Japanese FDI to other countries are not promoting export of that country to 
US. 
  Third, after controlling for US market size for each commodity, we confirmed 
that exports of many countries are in competition with Japanese exports.  But, the 
magnitude of coefficients remained much higher for China and Mexico.  Fourth, we 
found that the impact of Japanese trade on third country’s export to US is larger for 
Asian countries.  It is also true in general that coefficients are larger for countries in 
American Continent than those in Europe.   These evidences combined may seem to 
suggest that proximity of third-country either to competing country or to destination 
country is the major factor for determining the degree of impact.    Fifth, with the use of 
macroeconomic variables in triangular trade framework, the results we obtained 
indicate that the intensity of trade between a third-country and the US is also a key 
determinant for the degree of impact of Japanese trade. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews recent 
economic backgrounds for two distinguishing emerging countries in the Pasific Basin, 
namely China and Mexico.  Section 3 reviews previous studies in the literature and 
gives theoretical backgrounds for our framework of a triangular trade approach.  In 
section 4 we describe our data set.  Section 5 discusses our preliminary estimation 
results with macroeconomic variables.  These preliminary investigations suggest that 
we need to construct more disaggregated data comparable to trade data classification. 
Section 6 discusses the estimation results with more disaggregate explanatory data, 
namely foreign direct investment at industry level and US total import at commodity 
level.    Section 7 presents conclusions. 
   6
2. A Tale of Two Emerging Countries: China and Mexico 
a. China 
    The expansion of international trade for China in last twenty years has been at 
most rapid speed as China has maintained high growth rate of economy for the same 
period.  Specifically, export of China has almost tripled from 84.9 billion US dollars in 
1992 to 249 billion US dollars in 2000.  Import of China has also grown from 80.6 
billion US dollars in 1992 to 225 billion US dollars in 2000.  With the accession to the 
WTO in 2001, China’s trade is expected to experience even higher growth rate in years 
to  come.    
  However, China’s significant presence in world trade has also given rise to new 
trade disputes with trading partner countries.  With accusation for sluggish response 
to open up domestic markets for foreign corporations, China is also condemned for its 
pervasive violations of intellectual property rights of computer software.  A recent 
active debate between Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and 
Congress on restriction for textile imports from China signifies the political concerns 
over loss of manufacturing jobs in US industries competing directly with Chinese 
manufacturers3.  Other manufacturing products under debate are bedroom furniture, 
television sets, handbags and handcarts. 
  These disputes are clearly reminiscent of decade-old Japan-US trade conflicts.  
Whereas there was intense debate in both academics and business world on foreign 
access to domestic market in Japan4, Japanese exporters in textile, automobile and 
                                                  
3  See the following articles in New York Times; US moves to limit textile imports from 
China, Nov 19, 2003, and Greenspan warns Congress not to create trade barriers, Mar 
12, 2004. 
4  For example, papers in Krugman (1991) discuss the openness of Japanese domestic 
market.    Whereas Lawrence (1991) argues “keiretsu” is one of sources of trade barriers 
in Japan, Saxonhouse (1993) takes a view that Japan is not any different from other   7
semiconductor industries were put under allegations of unfair trade by US competitors.   
However, the magnitude of importance in US-Japan trade debate has gradually 
declined in last ten years, partly due to the emergence of new trade conflicts with China.   
For example, the number of trade dispute against Japan brought to the WTO is only one 
in five years of sample from 1999 to 2003. 
  Generally speaking, political conflicts between trading countries could change 
their forms with ever-increasing flows of foreign direct investment.  A decrease in the 
exports of a country might merely be a reflection of a global production shift by the 
country’s multinational corporations.  Particularly, US-Japan trade conflicts might be 
diminishing on surface partly due to the fact that significant part of Japanese exports 
has changed its country label from ‘made in Japan’ to ‘made in China.’  The number of 
cases for new Japanese foreign direct investment outflow to China, reported to the 
Ministry of Finance, exceeds Japanese FDI outflow to US in 1994, 1995 and 2002.   
  Moreover, the US and Japan are the most important countries as trading 
partner besides Hong Kong.    In 1992 Hong Kong was the China’s trading partner with 
the most traded values in both exports and imports.  However, this is due to Hong 
Kong’ s role as a middleman between China and the world as China moved toward a 
more decentralized economy5.  Assuming indirect trade flows via Hong Kong of China 
are proportional to direct trade flows of China, the US and Japan has been two largest 
trading partners for both exports and imports during the last decade.  China’s imports 
from Japan had tripled from 13.7 million dollars in 1992 to 41.5 million dollars in 2000 
and imports from the US had more than doubled from 8.9 million dollars in 1992 to 22.4 
                                                                                                                                                  
industrial countries. 
5  See Fung and Iizaka (1998) for a detailed description of Hong Kong’s role as a 
re-exporter of US and Japanese exports.   8
million dollars in 2000, see Table 1.  While China’s exports to Japan has dramatically 
increased almost four-folds from 11.7 million dollars in 1992 to 41.6 million dollars in 
2000, China’s exports to the US even surpassed growth of exports to Japan, jumping 
six-folds, from 8.6 million dollars in 1992 to 52.1 million dollars in 2000, see Table 2. 
 
b. Mexico 
  Mexican trade with adjacent countries has expanded significantly especially 
since North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became effective in 1994.  
Mexico has experienced most dramatic changes in trade and investment policies even 
before signing free trade agreement with two North American countries. Unilateral 
trade liberalization and domestic reform in Mexico brought down average tariff rate 
from 26% in 1985 to 12.5% in 1990, see Grether et al. (2001). 
  Table 4 presents major trading partners for Mexico between 1992 and 2000.  
The U.S. has been singularly the largest trading partners throughout this period for 
both imports and exports.  The share of the U.S. in Mexican imports is 73.7% and 
80.6% in Mexican exports in 1992.  The U.S. share in both exports and imports even 
soared after NAFTA became effective in 1994.  While lagging far from the U.S., Japan 
is one of the next largest exporters among Canada, France and Germany.  We can 
observe the importance of Canada, Mexico’s another partner in NAFTA, also increased 
after 1994. 
  Table 5 depicts Japanese FDIs, in terms of both values and cases, to selected 
Latin American countries from 1989 to 2002.    While Brazil usually receives the largest 
value of Japanese FDI in the region, Mexico received the largest value in two years6.  
                                                  
6  Of course the largest Japanese FDIs in Americas are directed to tax-haven territories such as Cayman 
Islands or Virgin Islands, however these FDIs are in financial sectors.    9
We can observe Japanese multinationals target Mexico as an important host country for 
FDI.    The size of FDI in Mexico appears smaller in both values and cases in comparison 
with Asian countries, however 65 billion yen investment from Japan in 1994 surpasses 
Japanese FDI for Korea.  In 1999 the value of 165 billion yen for FDI in Mexico is 
larger than any countries in the Asia.     
 
{More to be inserted} 
 
3. A Triangular Trade Approach and Related Literature 
3-1. FDI and Trade in a Three-Country Framework: Intra-firm Trade 
  When considering to sell products in a foreign market, a multinational firm can 
choose whether it exports the products directly from its home country, or produces them 
in the foreign market through its foreign subsidiaries.    In the empirical trade literature, 
many researchers have attempted to answer the question of whether foreign production 
(i.e., FDI) and exports are substitutes or complements.
7  Yamawaki (1991), Clausing 
(2000), and Head and Ries (2001) find that a complimentary relationship exists between 
foreign production and exports, whereas Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998) find that 
Japanese FDI and exports are substitutes only when the intention of FDI is to avoid 
antidumping tariffs in Europe. Blonigen (2001), using product-level data, finds FDI and 
exports are substitutes when FDI is horizontal.  However, these studies only focus on 
the relationship between outward FDI flows and exports.     
  Our framework is closer to Zhang and Felmingham (2001) who investigate the 
                                                  
7  More recent development in the literature can be also found in Helpman, et al. (2004) who find that the 
heterogeneity of firms in the industry is also an important determinant for the choice between exporting 
and foreign production through FDI.   10
causal relationship between inward FDI to China and Chinese exports.  Using data 
from both national and provincial levels, they confirm that the causal relationship is 
bidirectional.  Especially for the causality from inward FDI flows to exports, they 
argue that foreign investors who have superior knowledge on world market conditions 
tend to be successful in exporting their products from the host country.  In any case, 
these previous researches only looked at trade-FDI relationships between two countries, 
depicted as figure 1.a and figure1.b. 
    In this paper we extend the investigation on the FDI-trade relationship 
to a three-country framework.  Given the recent trends in international trade which 
involve a quite deal of intra-firm or intra-industry trade and FDI flows, that expand 
hand-in-hand with global trade, we think that investigating the dynamics of trade in the 
conventional bilateral framework is not sufficient.  In order to examine the dynamics 
of trade between China and the US, for example, we cannot ignore the effects of trade 
flows between China and other countries (besides the US), and FDI flows from other 
countries (besides the US) into China.  In what follows, we attempt to generalize the 
complex trilateral trade and FDI relationship in a simplest manner. 
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A. Vertical Foreign Direct Investment 
Let us consider the trade-FDI dynamics of one commodity among three 
countries: the US, Japan, and a third country which we call China for now.  For the 
sake of brevity, we assume that the US provides a market for the commodity, and that 
Japan has a multinational firm that produces the commodity.  The multinational firm 
may involve two firms for the production of the commodity: an upstream firm, U, and a 
downstream firm, D, while the former supplies intermediate goods to the latter which 
sells the final product to the US market.  If both downstream and upstream firms are 
established in Japan, the product will be exported directly from Japan to the US.  The 
trade dynamics of this first, base case are shown in Figure 2.a.  Arrows in the figure 
represent flows of goods.  In this case international trade flows are purely bilateral 
between the US and Japan, and involve no foreign production or FDI by the Japanese 
multinational. 
 
           
 










Figure 2.a : trade flows prior to 
Figure 2.b: trade flows after   12
FDI.
8  The Japanese multinational firm fragments its production by establishing a 
downstream firm D’ in China as a vertical FDI, and exports the product from there.  
This case is depicted in Figure 2.b.  We assume for simplicity that the domestic 
downstream plant D is shut down once the Japanese-affiliated plant D’ is established in 
China, and therefore that all of the exports come from D’.  This case leads to three 
changes in the trade flows among the three countries.    First, Japanese exports to the US 
stop because of the shut-down of the domestic plant D. Second, Japanese exports to 
China, instead, arise involving intra-firm trade between the parent firm U and its foreign 
affiliate D’.  Third, Chinese exports to the US emerge because the Japanese 
downstream plant in China starts shipping the product to the US. 
  In reality, a trilateral relationship is not as clear-cut as is shown above.  
However, we can generally predict that if Japanese firms are shifting their production to 
China through vertical FDI, Japanese exports to the US would decrease while both 
Japanese exports to China and Chinese exports to the US would increase. Thus, when 
vertical FDI is made, while Japanese exports of a certain product are observed to be 
decreasing, Japanese producers may be still exporting the same product to the US, but 
by bypassing through China. 
 
B. Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment 
  Next, we turn to a case where the Japanese multinational makes horizontal 
FDI.
9  Figure 3.a depicts the base model for this case in which the Japanese 
multinational, M, exports its product directly to the US.  However, unlike the case in 
                                                  
8  We can also consider the case in which the multinational firm shifts its upstream firm to the local 
market. However, this case still does not alter the nature of the existing trade flows. 
9  For the analysis on the determinants of vertical and horizontal trade, refer to Aizenman and Marion 
(2001).   13
Figure 2.a, we assume that the multinational does not possess a vertical chain of 
production – the firm’s production is vertically internalized.    Figure 3.b shows the case 
where horizontal FDI occurs, so that the product is now being exported directly from 
China instead of Japan.    In reality, as in Figure 2.b, the trade flows based on horizontal 
FDI would entail a decrease in Japanese direct exports to the US, but an increase in 
Chinese exports to the US.    However, unlike in the previous case with vertical FDI, the 
shift in the trade flows in this case does not lead to any intra-firm trade between Japan 
and China.
10 
       
3-3. Do Imports Promote Export? 
  Besides FDI flows, other factors can affect the trilateral trade relationship.  
Some studies find that the imports of foreign products with higher quality can force 
domestic competitors to become more efficient through international competition.  
MacDonald (1994) finds that US industries’ productivity level rose as the import 
                                                  
10  The presence of foreign affiliates can also create spillover effects on local exporters.    Javorcik (2004) 
finds evidence for positive spillover effects of foreign affiliates on their local suppliers.    Spillovers from 
foreign affiliates can help local firms not only to improve their productivity level, but also to become 
competitive exporters in the international markets.    In such a case, we can expect an increase in the 







Figure 3.a: trade flows prior  Figure 3.b: trade flows after   14
penetration ratio increased.
11 An overwhelming amount of studies, on the other hand, 
find that more efficient firms tend to export.    Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that both 
the growth rates and the levels of success measures are higher for exporters in ex-ante, 
i.e., “good firms become exporters.” Combining these two findings and applying to our 
trilateral trade analysis, we can hypothesize that an increase in the exports from a 
Japanese firm (JPN) to China may lead a Chinese domestic firm (CHN) to become more 
efficient and start exporting.  This case is shown in Figure 4.  Although the trade 
flows look alike to the case in Figure 2.b, this case does not involve any FDI flows. 
 
3-4. Competition or Complements 
  Lastly, not the least, we can think of a case where Japanese exports to the US 
and Chinese exports to the US are substitutes. This is highly probable for an industry in 
which the exports of the two countries are similar in quality (see Figure 5). In this case, 
head-to-head competition may arise between Japanese and Chinese firms, which can be 
observed as a negative correlation between Japanese and Chinese exports to the US. 
  On the other hand, Japanese and Chinese exports to the US could have a 
complementary relationship if both countries produce intermediate products, but each 
for different production stages, and export them to the US market where a firm in the 
US produces the final goods using these intermediate products.    In this case, we should 
observe a positive correlation between Japanese and Chinese exports to the US. It is, 
however, unlikely to find products from two countries to be complements if we use data 
based on the industry classification as disaggregated as the HS 4-digit level, which we 
                                                  
11  In a more generalized sense, we can also think that competitive pressure can increase the productivity 
of firms or industries.    Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) find that competitive pressure in iron-ore 
markets led to an increase in US labor productivity.   15
use in our study.  Therefore, we should expect to find a negative correlation between 
Japanese and Chinese exports to the US with an assumption that the competitive effect 
outweighs the complimentary effect. 
 
            
 
 
3-5. The “Triangular Trade Approach” 
  The above discussions have shown the complexity of the trade-FDI dynamics, 
but also demonstrated that we can unravel the complex dynamics by examining the 
relationships between different flows of trade among the three countries.  Figure 5 
presents a generic export flow chart among the three countries.  The Japanese exports 
to the US and those to China are denoted as JPNUS and JPNCHN, respectively, while 
the Chinese exports to the US is denoted as CHNUS.
12   
                                                  
12  For the sake of brevity, we continue to use China as the third country.    However, in the empirical 
analysis section, we will test seven other Asian countries as the third countries. 
US 
China Japan 





Figure 4: positive spillover   
effect from imports 
Figure 5: competition (substitutive 
relationship): negative correlation   16
 
  Table 6 summarizes all the scenarios we discussed and expected signs for the 
correlations between two of the three trade flows.  As for the relationship between 
JPNCHN and CHNUS, we should expect a positive correlation if vertical FDI is made 
by Japanese firms to China or if Japanese exports to China create spillover effects on 
Chinese firms and lead them to export to the US.  As for the relationship between 
JPNUS and CHNUS, we should expect a negative correlation if vertical or horizontal 
FDI is made by Japanese firms to China or if the products from China and Japan are in 
direct competition in the US market.
13   
 
Table 6: Expected Signs for the Correlation between Trade Flows 
  JPNCHN and CHNUS  JPNUS and CHNUS   
Vertical FDI  positive  negative 
Horizontal  FDI   –   negative 
Imports-Exports positive  – 
Competition –  positive 
                                                  






Figure 6: the Triangular Trade Approach   17
 
  In this study, we will employ what we call the “triangular trade approach,” in 
which we will examine the type of trade-FDI dynamics by empirically looking at the 
correlations between the two types of trade flows as shown in Table 6 in the trilateral 
trade relationship among Japan, the US, and China (or other “third countries”).  More 
specifically, we will use the export flow from China, or third countries, to the US 
(CHNUS or THDUS) as the dependent variable in the empirical model while including 
Japan’s exports to China, or the third countries (JPNCHN or JPNTHD) as well as 
Japan’s exports to the US (JPNUS) as explanatory variables.     
 
4. The Data   
  The exports data used in this study are extracted at the HS 4-digit level from 
International Trade by Commodity Statistics, Harmonized System Rev.1, OECD.  At 
this level of disaggregation, there are 1,367 commodity classifications.  From this set 
of data, we select our sample in the following two steps.  First, we remove the 
commodities which are either not traded between a pair of countries or missing in any of 
the years in our sample period of 1990 through 2000.  We also restrict our sample to 
comprise the commodities for which a complete set of observations exists with a strictly 
positive amount of trade for the entire sample period.  Second, since we need three 
flows of exports for each of the “third countries” (seven Asian countries and China): 
Japanese exports to the third country; Japanese exports to the US; and the third 
country’s exports to the US, we restrict our data to only those commodities for which all 
of the three export flows exist.  This selection process reduces the number of 
observations considerably, and also causes it to vary (even for the same HS 4-digit 
classification codes) depending on the third countries due to data availability.  For   18
example, there are 576 commodities for China while there are only 162 commodities for 
Indonesia.
14 
  Annual observations of exchange rate volatility are constructed from monthly 
exchange rates from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  Other macroeconomic 
variables, such as inflation rates, real GDP per capita, nominal GDP, and aggregate trade 
flows, are retrieved from IMF’s IFS and Direction of Trade.    We also include the trade 
intensity indices for each pair of trading countries using the method in Frankel and Rose 
(1997) and the data from DOT and IFS.    More details on the data definitions are given 
in Appendix 1. 
 
5. Empirical Results with the Base Model 
5-1. Model Specification and Empirical Results 
  First, we specify our panel data estimation equation for the first-differenced 
trade among three countries as equation (1). 
 
  ,, , ,
USTHD JPNTHD JPNUS




it T ∆  is the first-differenced export of a third-country to US,  ,
JPNTHD
it T ∆  is the 
first-differenced Japanese export to a third-country and  ,
JPNUS
it T ∆  is  the 
first-differenced Japanese export to US for commodity i at year t.   i λ  is a fixed-effect 
for commodity i. 
  With HS4 commodity fixed-effect dummies, export to the US is regressed on 
                                                  
14  The numbers of commodities for Asian economies are 576 for China, 572 for Korea, 487 for Hong 
Kong, 288 for Singapore, 310 for Thailand, 162 for Indonesia, 180 for the Philippines, and 218 for 
Malaysia.    For American continent countries, the numbers of commodities are 86 for Argentina, 275 for 
Brazil, 503 for Canada and 331 for Mexico while these for European countries are 558 for France, 644 for 
Germany, 473 for Italy and 623 for UK.   19
JPNTHIRD and JPNUS for each individual country.  The estimated results are 
presented in Table 7.    The estimated coefficient for Japanese exports to a third-country 
is almost always positive when statistically significant.  The size of the coefficients is 
found to be higher for Asian countries, reflecting a stronger tie with the Japanese 
economy.  Especially for Korea, Singapore and Malaysia, their estimated coefficients 
are 0.30, 0.31 and 0.73, respectively, tenfold of the average coefficient among the 
European countries.  Also for Mexico, a country closer to the US, the estimated 
coefficient is notably as large as 0.95, almost one to one correspondence between the 
Japanese exports to Mexico and the Mexican exports to the U.S.    For Canada, however, 
the estimated coefficient is negative and (statistically) significantly large. 
  The expected sign for the coefficient of the Japanese exports to the US can be 
positive when there are common factors causing the world exports to increase (e.g. high 
growth of the US markets). It can be negative, however, when the products of Japan and 
a third-country are competing head-to-head.  Also, if a large portion of the 
third-country export to the US is related to the products of Japanese affiliated firms, a 
production shift between Japan and the third-country can account for the negative 
relationship. 
  The estimated coefficient is positive with statistical significance for most of the 
countries.  For these countries with significant positive coefficient, the estimated 
coefficients are less than 0.1 – an increase in Japanese exports to US leads to an 
increase in the export of that country to US markets in the order of 10 percent.  For 
Korea and Canada, the coefficients are even higher as 0.22 and 0.27, respectively.  
Most strikingly, the estimated coefficient for China is negative, -0.04, with statistical 
significance.  This is a strong supporting evidence for a view that Japanese 
multinational corporations are shifting their production location from Japan to China   20
and a decrease in the exports to US markets is substituted by an increase in the exports 
by Japanese affiliates in China.     
  Next, we combined all individual countries in one panel data set.    With results 
from previous individual country estimation, we assume the impact of Japanese trade 
on the export of a third-country to be different among the countries in our sample.    The 
specification for our model needs to allow for heterogeneous coefficients as in equation 
(2).  Subscript j is added to denote for j-th country.  
j D  is a dummy variable which 
takes value 1 for a country j and zero otherwise. 
  ,, ,, ,, , ,,
11
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THDUS j JPNTHD j JPNUS
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TD T D T α βλ ε
==
∆= ∆ + ∆+ + ∑∑    (2) 
 
  In Table 8 we report the panel data estimation result of all 16 countries 
combined.    In this regression we did not restrict industries in each country to be same, 
so the total number of observation is the sum of Table 5, 62,860.  The result remains 
quite similar to those in Table 7. 
 
5-2. Country Characteristics as Explanatory Variables 
  As often found in bilateral trade estimation using gravity model, we include 
macroeconomic variables in addition to Japanese trade variables we have used in 
previous regressions.   
k
t j Z ,   represents k-th exogenous variables for country j at year t. 
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In contrast to previous studies in empirical bilateral trade literature, most of 
macroeconomic variables turned out to be insignificant, see Table 9.  In addition there 
is only a little improvement in adjusted R-squared. 
  We strongly doubt that the failure of macroeconomic variables in explaining 
the export of third country to US rests on relatively small number of different values 
these macroeconomic variables can take.    For example, NY_US, nominal income of the 
US, can take only 10 different values in a sample space of 62,860 observations.  In 
contrast, the number of different values for dependent export variable is approximately 
equal to the number of observation.    Explanatory power of macroeconomic variables in 
previous studies on bilateral trade hinges on the use of aggregated trade data.  We 
would need to construct some data with more variation which corresponds more closely 
to that of dependent variable. 
 
6. The Empirical Results with More Disaggregated Explanatory 
Variables 
  Given the above discussion, we reestimate our estimation model using more 
disaggregated data for the control variables. Instead of the macroeconomic variables we 
used above, we include US total imports (disaggregated at the HS 4-digit level) to 
control for changes in US demand for each commodity, and Japanese FDI (at the HS 
2-digit level) to capture a possible production shift by Japanese multinational 
corporations. 
6-1. Data Construction 
    As the income level of a country can be an appropriate explanatory 
variable in conventional bilateral trade models with aggregate trade data, we can expect 
the amount of income allocated for a particular commodity to be an explanatory variable   22
for our model with disaggregated trade data.    From this perspective, we then choose an 
actual expenditure allocated for each imported commodity, i.e., total import for each HS 
4-digit commodity, as a proxy variable, hoping that this variable will circumvent the 
simultaneity problem for the JPNUS variable.  For this variable, we use the same data 
set from OECD’s International Trade by Commodity Statistics, Harmonized System 
Rev.1, and call this variable USMAR.
15  Unlike the macroeconomic variables, this 
variable takes as many different values as the dependent variable. 
  In section 3, we discussed that Japanese FDI to the third countries may lead to 
an increase in the third countries’ exports to the US while the Japanese FDI brings about 
vertical intra-firm trade between parent multinationals and their subsidiaries overseas 
(see Figure 2.b).  Hence, the estimation for the effect of Japanese exports to the third 
countries on the latter’s exports to the US in the previous analysis may have reflected 
the effect of Japanese FDI flows to the third countries.  In this section, we include in 
our estimation a variable that specifically refers to Japanese FDI to the third countries, 
so that the effect of Japanese FDI can be separated from that of Japanese exports to the 
third countries. For that variable, we use the data from the Overseas Japanese 
Companies Data (OJCD) from Toyo Keizai. OJCD contains the information for 
approximately 19,000 Japanese overseas subsidiaries, categorized in 68 industry 
classifications (which do not correspond to HS industry classifications), including each 
subsidiary’s established year, location, business objectives, industry classification, and 
other relevant information.  Among the 68 industries, we exclude those industries 
which do not actively engage in goods trade such as real estate and banking sectors.  
Then, we reallocate OJCD’s codes to corresponding HS 2-digit codes and reclassify the 
                                                  
15  Like other trade-related variables, we include USMAR as the first differenced variable.   23
data to create the FDI data based on the HS classifications.
16  The new variable refers 
to Japanese FDI in the Asian third countries in terms of the number of the subsidiaries 




6-2. The Estimation Result 
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  The result of estimation for equation (4) is summarized in Table 10.  The 
coefficients of FDI are significantly positive only for China and Mexico.  The 
coefficients of USIMP are all positive and significant.     
  We can observe some striking results for the estimated coefficients of Japanese 
exports to a third-country.  The estimated coefficient of Japanese export to China 
becomes no longer significant.  For estimation result for equation (2) we observed that 
Japanese exports to China is promoting Chinese exports to US.  However, this effect 
disappears after controlling FDI in equation (4).  With these results combined, we can 
conclude that Japanese export to China is promoting Chinese export to US only through 
shift of Japanese production plants to China. 
                                                  
16  The concordance table is shown in Appendix 2.    When a particular OJCD code covers more than two 
HS 2-digit codes, the FDI data for this OJCD code is counted in all corresponding HS 2-digit codes.     
17  Therefore, two different HS 4-digit codes with the same first two digits share the same number of 
accumulated Japanese affiliated firms.    This may not be problematic as long as there is cross-industry 
effect within the HS 2-digit level since we are trying to capture the trade-promoting effect of FDI.   24
  Mexican export to US is in stark contrast to the case of China.    The coefficient 
of Japanese export to Mexico remains significant at one percent level while the 
coefficient of FDI is also positive at one percent significance level.  For Mexico we can 
infer that Japanese exports to Mexico have some enhancement effect on Mexican 
exports to US in addition to Japanese FDI-related exports.    The persistence of positive 
coefficient of Japanese export to Mexico can be attributed to technological-transfer 
effect or competitive effect of foreign products imported, described in section 3.     
  In contrast to the result of Table 8, in which China and Philippine are only 
countries with significantly negative coefficients for Japanese exports to US, the 
coefficients of additional seven countries become negative with five percent significance 
level.    These seven countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil, France, Italy and 
UK.  We believe including a USIMP variable, a proxy for expenditure level in each 
commodity market, eliminated positive income effect of US market growth previously 
captured by the JPNUS variable.  It is noteworthy that the coefficient of JPNUS for 
China is relatively larger than those of other countries.  The degree of competition 
between Chinese exports and Japanese export is very high. 
  We also investigated equation (4) with inclusion of macroeconomic variables.  




  In our empirical exploration, we found that the exports of China and those of 
Japan are directly competing in US markets while the exports of China to the US also 
                                                  
18  The coefficient of FDI for China becomes statistically insignificant; however, its 
p-value is 13.4%.   25
appears to be promoted partly by Japanese exports to China.  However, after 
controlling for Japan’s FDI to China on industry category, the trade enhancing effect of 
Japanese exports disappears.  With a statistically significant coefficient for Japanese 
FDI to China, we can conclude that Japanese exports to China seem to promote Chinese 
exports to the US because of increasing vertical trades between Japanese multinationals 
and their corresponding affiliates in China. The combined evidence of the substitutive 
relationship between Chinese and Japanese exports to the US and the export-promoting 
effect of Japanese FDI to China confirms a view that while Chinese exports compete 
vigorously with Japanese exports in US markets, Japanese multinationals are shifting 
their production bases to China and forming a global production network. 
  Our results for other Asian countries show that Indonesian and Philippine 
exports are also competing with Japanese exports in US markets.    However, the degree 
of the competition with Japanese exports is found to be much higher for China.  We 
also found some evidence that the impact of Japanese trade on exports of third-country 
to the US in general is larger in Asia.  This is especially true for Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippine, and Singapore. 
  Mexican export to the U.S. appears in stark contrast to the case of China.  
Even after we control for Japanese FDI to Mexico, trade promoting effect of Japanese 
export to Mexico still remains positive and significant.  One interpretation suggests 
that technological spillover from Japanese export to tradable sectors in Mexico is much 
greater because rules of origin require participation from and dissemination of 
technology to local firms.  Similarly with China, Japanese FDI to Mexico provides 
trade enhancement effect to Mexican exporting sectors.  This is quite in conformity 
with findings of Cuadros et al (2004) in which total FDI in Mexico are found to Granger 
cause Mexican trade.   26
  It is also noteworthy that our empirical evidence indicates that the impact of 
Japanese trade is stronger for countries in American Continent than those in Europe.  
These evidences combined may seem to suggest that proximity of third-country either to 
competing country, i.e., Japan, or to destination country, i.e., the U.S., is the major 
factor for determining the degree of impact.   
  Our study shed light on the current debate about the trade disputes between 
China and the US from a different angle and presented results that may involve political 
ramifications.  The main finding from our empirical analysis indicates that a surge in 
Chinese exports to the US may involve a quite deal of products manufactured by 
Japanese affiliates in China and therefore may simply reflect change in Japanese 
multinational corporations’ strategy in global production.  Of course, for industries in 
which Chinese exports are currently under allegations, these particular products 
individually may not be strongly related to Japanese multinational operations.  With 
the general perception of Chinese exports “threatening” US industry, however, we will 
probably continue to see more cases against China brought into the WTO trade dispute 
settlement mechanism.  Eventually, we may also see cases against China, but the ones 
that actually involves products of Japanese multinational corporations. 
   27
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Appendix 1:   
exvol_US = exchange volatility between THD’s currency and the U.S. dollars 
exvol_JPN = exchange volatility between THD’s currency and Japanese yen 
inf_THD = THD’s inflation rate   
inf_US = US inflation rate 
inf_JPN = Japanese inflation rate 
rypc_THD = real GDP per capita of THD 
rypc_US = real GDP per capita of US 
rypc_JPN = real GDP per capita of Japan 
ny_THD = nominal GDP of THD 
ny_US = nominal GDP of US 
ny_JPN == nominal GDP of Japan 
W_IMP_THD = THD’s imports from the world 
W_IMP_US = US imports from the world 
W_IMP_JPN = Japanese imports from the world 
W_EXP_THD = THD’s exports to the world 
W_EXP_US = US exports to the world 
W_EXP_JPN = Japanese exports to the world 
 Appendix2: Concordance Table for FDI and Trade Classification
HS Code HS Code
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1 53 700 2700
3 200 600 2600 54 700 2700
5 200 600 2600 55 700 2700
6 200 2600 56 700 2700
7 200 600 2600 57 700 2700
9 200 600 2600 58 700 2700
10 200 600 2600 59 700 2700
11 200 600 2600 60 700 2700
12 200 600 2600 61 700 2700
13 200 600 2600 62 700 2700
14 200 600 2600 63 700 2700




19 600 68 1400 3200
20 600 69 1400 3200
21 600 70 1400 3200
22 600 71
23 600 72 1500 3300
24 73 1500 3300
25 300 74 1600 1700 3400 3500
26 300 75 1600 1700 3400 3500
27 300 1200 3000 76 1600 1700 3400 3500
28 1100 2900 78 1600 1700 3400 3500
29 1100 2900 79 1600 1700 3400 3500
30 1100 2900 80 1600 1700 3400 3500
31 1100 2900 81 1600 1700 3400 3500
32 1100 2900 82 1600 1700 3400 3500
33 1100 2900 83 1600 1700 3400 3500
34 1100 2900 84 1800 3600
35 1100 2900 85 1900 3700
36 1100 2900 86 2000 3800
37 1100 2900 87 2100 3900
38 1100 2900 88 2000 3800
39 1100 2900 89 2000 3800
40 1300 3100 90 2200 4000
41 1300 3100 91 2200 4000
42 1300 3100 92 2300
44 800 2800 93
46 800 2800 94
48 900 2800 95
49 1000 96
50 700 2700 97
51 700 2700
52 700 2700
Toyo Keizai Code Toyo Keizai CodeTable 1: China’s Trade with Major Trading Partners 
                                                    ( t h o u s a n d s   o f   d o l l a r s )  
 Imports   
     1 9 9 2                1995                1 9 9 8                 2 0 0 0   
 1  Hong  Kong   20,533,589     Japan      29,004,529        Japan      28,275,074        Japan      41,509,675   
 2  Japan    13,682,461     United  States   16,118,291        United  States   16,883,171        Taiwan       25,493,561   
 3  United  States   8,900,735     Taiwan       14,783,944        Taiwan       16,631,051        Korea       23,207,406   
 4  Taiwan       5,865,971     Korea       10,293,234        Korea       15,014,348        United  States   22,363,148   
 5  Germany      4,015,042     Hong  Kong         8,590,713        Germany        7,020,657        Germany      10,408,731   
   
  World     80,585,333       World     132,083,539        World     140,236,807        World     225,093,731   
                                                            
                                                            
 E x p o r t s                                                           
     1992               1995                1 9 9 8                 2 0 0 0   
 1  Hong  Kong   37,512,229       Hong  Kong     35,983,427        Hong  Kong     38,741,792        United  States   52,099,220   
 2  Japan    11,678,713       Japan      28,466,685        United  States   37,947,666        Hong  Kong     44,518,285   
 3  United  States   8,593,800       United  States   24,713,498        Japan      29,660,114        Japan      41,654,314   
 4  Germany      2,447,990       Korea         6,687,805        Germany        7,354,309        Korea       11,292,364   
 5  Korea       2,404,912       Germany        5,671,451        Korea         6,251,516        Germany        9,277,790   
   
  World     84,940,062       World     148,779,565        World     183,809,065        World     249,202,551   
Source: ITCS,OECD Table 2:    Shares of Trade with Japan and the US among the Asian countries 
 
Exporting Country 
  1990    1995    2000   
  J a p a n   U S      Japan  US     Japan  US   
 
China    0.15   0.08     0.19   0.17     0.17   0.21  
Korea    0.19   0.29     0.13   0.19     0.12   0.22  
Hong  Kong  0.06   0.24     0.06   0.22     0.06   0.23  
Singapore  0.09   0.21     0.08   0.18     0.08   0.17  
Thailand   0.17   0.23     0.17   0.18     0.15   0.21  
Indonesia    0.43   0.13     0.27   0.14     0.23   0.14  
Philippine  0.20   0.38     0.16   0.36     0.15   0.30  





  1990    1995    2000   
  J a p a n   U S      Japan  US     Japan  US   
 
China    0.14   0.12     0.22   0.12     0.18   0.10  
Korea    0.25   0.23     0.24   0.23     0.20   0.18  
Hong  Kong  0.16   0.08     0.15   0.08     0.12   0.07  
Singapore  0.20   0.16     0.21   0.15     0.17   0.15  
Thailand   0.30   0.11     0.29   0.12     0.25   0.12  
Indonesia    0.25   0.11     0.23   0.12     0.16   0.10  
Philippine  0.18   0.20     0.22   0.18     0.19   0.17  
Malaysia   0.24   0.17     0.27   0.16     0.21   0.17  
 
Source: Direction of Trade,  IMF        
        Table3 : Japanese Foreign Direct Investment to the Asia countries (1989 - 2002) 
(100  million  Yen)                 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
China     587   511   787  1,381  1,954  2,683  4,319 2,828 2,438 1,377  849  1,112  1,808  2,152 
      (126) (165) (246) (490) (700) (636) (770) (365) (258) (114)   (78) (105) (189) (263) 
Korea     799   419   357   291   289   420   433   468   543   389  1,094   899   704   763 
       (81)   (54)   (48)   (28)   (34)   (27)   (25)   (33)   (53)   (48)   (62)   (52)   (47)   (44) 
Hong  Kong  2,502 2,610 1,260   966  1,447 1,179 1,106 1,675  860   789  1,088  1,039   374   248 
      (335) (244) (178) (154) (184) (112) (119)   (89) (121)   (51)   (76)   (52)   (37)   (31) 
Singapore  2,573  1,232   837   875   735  1,101  1,143 1,256 2,238   832  1,102   505  1,433   915 
      (181)  (139)  (103)  (100)   (97)   (69)   (94)  (102)   (96)   (58)   (51)   (25)   (31)   (34) 
Thailand  1,703 1,696 1,107   849    680    749  1,196 1,581 2,291 1,760   924  1,030 1,105   614 
      (403) (377) (258) (130) (127) (126) (147) (196) (154)   (72)   (72)   (62)   (51)   (52) 
Indonesia   840  1,615 1,628 2,142   952  1,808 1,548 2,720 3,085 1,398 1,024   464    622    509 
      (140) (155) (148) (122) (115) (116) (168) (160) (170)   (64)   (57)   (26)   (56)   (41)  
Philippine   269   383   277   210   236   683   692   630   642   488   689   514   951   500   
       (87)   (58)   (42)   (45)   (56)   (75)  (100)   (75)   (64)   (46)   (32)   (44)   (25)   (20)   
Malaysia   902  1,067  1,202   919   892   772   555   644   971   668   588   256   320    98   
      (159)  (169)  (136)  (111)   (92)   (51)   (57)   (69)   (82)   (34)   (44)   (23)   (18)   (11)   
 
World    90,339 83,527 56,862 44,313 41,514 42,808 49,568 54,095 66,236 52,413 74,703 53,854 39,922 44,175  
      (6589) (5863) (4564) (3741) (3488) (2478) (2863) (2501) (2495) (1616) (1729) (1701) (1768) (2144)  
Source: Outward Direct Investment, Ministry of Finance, Japan.    Figures in parentheses indicates the number of FDI cases. Table 4: Mexico's Trade with Major Trading Partners
Imports (thousands of dollars)
1992 1995 1998 2000
1 United States 45,640,600 United States 53,784,324 United States 93,149,905 United States 135,323,974
2 Japan 2,819,088 Japan 3,951,072 Germany 4,541,975 Germany 5,285,861
3 Germany 2,318,560 Germany 2,686,360 Japan 4,534,795 Japan 3,447,084
4 France 1,260,217 Canada 1,374,035 Canada 2,255,646 Canada 3,386,463
5 Brazil 1,029,262 France 978,959 Korea 1,822,463 Korea 1,874,931
World 61,923,146 World 72,452,988 World 125,323,804 World 171,058,090
Exports
1992 1995 1998 2000
1 United States 37,052,881 United States 65,063,498 United States 101,974,910 United States 146,648,432
2 Spain 1,232,191 Canada 2,060,803 Canada 1,716,021 Canada 3,302,315
3 Canada 1,009,236 Japan 1,017,282 Germany 1,110,454 Germany 1,542,286
4 Japan 843,112 Spain 877,852 Brazil 737,788 Spain 1,509,996
5 France 591,332 Brazil 853,395 Chile 731,369 Japan 930,066
World 45,944,859 World 79,277,692 World 117,342,753 World 165,272,079
Source: ITCS, OECDTable 5 : Japanese Foreign Direct Investment to Latin American Countries (1989-2002)
100 million Yen
(Cases)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
4 304 55 24 39 21 110 15 70 164 9 45 21 44
(1) (4) (6) (2) (1) (2) (8) (3) (6) (9) (3) (4) (1) (1)
464 892 235 606 492 1,308 287 993 1,451 597 730 249 1,714 495
(39) (15) (16) (40) (29) (33) (38) (31) (34) (29) (25) (9) (6) (11)
62 43 102 35 4 14 136 2 28 25 15 31 38 7
(10) (11) (8) (7) (2) (2) (6) (2) (5) (7) (1) (2) (1) (2)
47 248 261 78 61 651 202 128 393 106 1,655 230 58 103
(9) (14) (13) (14) (12) (8) (9) (10) (11) (11) (27) (5) (4) (8)




MexicoTable 7: Within-Estimators for Exports to US by Individual Country
Exporting Country JPNTHIRD JPNUS Adj.R2 NOB
China 0.125 *** -0.048 *** 0.51 5760
Korea 0.301 *** 0.215 *** 0.33 5720
Taiwan 0.156 *** 0.073 *** 0.40 6300
Hong Kong 0.071 *** 0.022 *** 0.14 4870
Singapore 0.319 *** 0.082 *** 0.11 2880
Thailand 0.006 0.024 *** 0.34 3100
Indonesia 0.024 * -0.004 * 0.10 1620
Philippine 0.161 *** -0.024 *** 0.49 1800
Malaysia 0.732 *** 0.053 *** 0.39 2180
Canada -2.240 *** 0.275 *** 0.49 5030
Mexico 0.946 *** 0.031 *** 0.37 3310
Brazil -0.086 ** 0.005 *** -0.04 2750
Argentina 0.003 0.001 -0.07 860
France 0.095 *** 0.014 *** 0.04 5580
Germany 0.004 0.089 *** 0.30 6440
Italy 0.016 0.018 *** 0.10 4730




Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
JPNCHN 0.125*** JPNUS(CHN) -0.048***
(0.035) (0.008)
JPNKOR 0.301*** JPNUS(KOR) 0.215***
(0.021) (0.006)
JPNHKG 0.071**  JPNUS(HKG) 0.022** 
(0.034) (0.009)
JPNSGP 0.319*** JPNUS(SGP) 0.082***
(0.026) (0.010)
JPNTHA 0.006    JPNUS(THA) 0.024***
(0.049) (0.009)
JPNIDN 0.024    JPNUS(IDN) -0.004   
(0.050) (0.009)
JPNPHL 0.161*   JPNUS(PHL) -0.024***
(0.095) (0.008)
JPNMAL 0.732*** JPNUS(MAL) 0.053***
(0.038) (0.010)
JPNCAN -2.240*** JPNUS(CAN) 0.275***
(0.036) (0.006)
JPNMEX 0.946*** JPNUS(MEX) 0.031***
(0.087) (0.006)
JPNBRA -0.086    JPNUS(BRA) 0.005   
(0.128) (0.006)
JPNARG 0.003    JPNUS(ARG) 0.001   
(0.495) (0.009)
JPNFRA 0.095    JPNUS(FRA) 0.014** 
(0.078) (0.006)
JPNGER 0.004    JPNUS(GER) 0.089***
(0.023) (0.006)
JPNITA 0.016    JPNUS(ITA) 0.018***
(0.103) (0.006)
JPNUK 0.032    JPNUS(UK) 0.039***
(0.041) (0.006)
Note: standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,




Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
JPNCHN 0.123*** JPNUS(CHN) -0.049*** IMP_US 0.122   
(0.035) (0.008) (0.121)
JPNKOR 0.296*** JPNUS(KOR) 0.215*** IMP_JPN -0.151   
(0.021) (0.006) (0.201)
JPNHKG 0.077**  JPNUS(HKG) 0.022**  EXP_US 1.080***
(0.034) (0.009) (0.107)
JPNSGP 0.318*** JPNUS(SGP) 0.082*** EXP_JPN -0.211   
(0.026) (0.010) (0.214)
JPNTHA 0.016    JPNUS(THA) 0.024*** EXVOL_US -1,877.750   
(0.049) (0.009) (8,295)
JPNIDN 0.029    JPNUS(IDN) -0.003    INF_THD -0.122   
(0.050) (0.009) (1.078)
JPNPHL 0.165*   JPNUS(PHL) -0.023*** INF_US -1,399.770   
(0.094) (0.008) (1,581)
JPNMAL 0.734*** JPNUS(MAL) 0.053*** NY_THD 0.000   
(0.038) (0.010) (0.004)
JPNCAN -2.236*** JPNUS(CAN) 0.272*** NY_US -0.048***
(0.036) (0.006) (0.018)
JPNMEX 0.945*** JPNUS(MEX) 0.030*** NY_JPN 0.002   
(0.087) (0.006) (0.003)
JPNBRA -0.085    JPNUS(BRA) 0.005    TRADEINT2_US -4,990.010   
(0.128) (0.006) (5,308)
JPNARG 0.000    JPNUS(ARG) 0.002    TRADEINT2_JPN 1,932.610   
(0.494) (0.009) (4,356)
JPNFRA 0.090    JPNUS(FRA) 0.015*** IMP_WORLD_THD 0.007   
(0.078) (0.006) (0.029)
JPNGER 0.003    JPNUS(GER) 0.090*** IMP_WORLD_US 0.166***
(0.023) (0.006) (0.063)
JPNITA 0.019    JPNUS(ITA) 0.018*** IMP_WORLD_JPN -0.035   
(0.103) (0.006) (0.044)
JPNUK 0.032    JPNUS(UK) 0.039*** EXP_WORLD_THD 0.024   
(0.041) (0.006) (0.027)




Note: standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.Table10 : Panel Estimates with Heterogenous Coefficients (16 Countries)
NOB=  62860 SSR = .153418*10
15 Adj.R
2= .494 (0.4939)
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
JPNCHN 0.038    JPNUS(CHN) -0.141*** FDICHN 51.358*** USIMP(CHN) 0.052***
(0.032) (0.008) (19) (0.002)
JPNKOR 0.202*** JPNUS(KOR) 0.055*** FDIKOR -531.120**  USIMP(KOR) 0.093***
(0.019) (0.006) (213) (0.002)
JPNHKG 0.048    JPNUS(HKG) 0.012    FDIHKG -42.172    USIMP(HKG) 0.006***
(0.033) (0.009) (152) (0.002)
JPNSGP 0.263*** JPNUS(SGP) 0.063*** FDISGP -107.803    USIMP(SGP) 0.017***
(0.026) (0.010) (164) (0.003)
JPNTHA -0.002    JPNUS(THA) 0.013    FDITHA -27.908    USIMP(THA) 0.006** 
(0.045) (0.010) (64) (0.003)
JPNIDN 0.026    JPNUS(IDN) -0.020**  FDIIDN -76.020    USIMP(IDN) 0.008***
(0.045) (0.009) (213) (0.002)
JPNPHL -0.003    JPNUS(PHL) -0.083*** FDIPHL 90.768    USIMP(PHL) 0.031***
(0.088) (0.010) (270) (0.003)
JPNMAL 0.440*** JPNUS(MAL) -0.041*** FDIMAL -647.534*** USIMP(MAL) 0.068***
(0.037) (0.009) (176) (0.003)
JPNCAN -1.900*** JPNUS(CAN) 0.024*** FDICAN 874.617*   USIMP(CAN) 0.134***
(0.034) (0.007) (508) (0.002)
JPNMEX 0.916*** JPNUS(MEX) -0.170*** FDIMEX 2,617.740*** USIMP(MEX) 0.113***
(0.079) (0.007) (433) (0.002)
JPNBRA -0.095    JPNUS(BRA) -0.021*** FDIBRA -34.160    USIMP(BRA) 0.015***
(0.117) (0.006) (547) (0.002)
JPNARG 0.003    JPNUS(ARG) -0.014    FDIARG -751.063    USIMP(ARG) 0.008***
(0.452) (0.009) (3687) (0.003)
JPNFRA 0.036    JPNUS(FRA) -0.018*** FDIFRA -55.887    USIMP(FRA) 0.019***
(0.072) (0.006) (398) (0.002)
JPNGER 0.032    JPNUS(GER) 0.024*** FDIGER -128.939    USIMP(GER) 0.037***
(0.021) (0.006) (210) (0.002)
JPNITA -0.073    JPNUS(ITA) -0.016**  FDIITA -36.647    USIMP(ITA) 0.020***
(0.095) (0.007) (766) (0.002)
JPNUK 0.105*** JPNUS(UK) -0.038*** FDIUK 44.835    USIMP(UK) 0.043***
(0.038) (0.007) (199) (0.002)
Note: standard deviations are in parenthesesTable11 : Panel Estimates with Heterogenous Coefficients (16 Countries)
NOB= 62860 SSR= 1.53232*10
14 Adj.R
2= .494 (0.4943)
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
JPNCHN 0.036    JPNUS(CHN) -0.141*** FDICHN 30.709    USIMP(CHN) 0.051*** IMP_US 0.098   
(0.032) (0.008) (21) (0.002) (0.114)
JPNKOR 0.198*** JPNUS(KOR) 0.055*** FDIKOR -672.792*** USIMP(KOR) 0.093*** IMP_JPN -0.191   
(0.019) (0.006) (218) (0.002) (0.187)
JPNHKG 0.052    JPNUS(HKG) 0.012    FDIHKG -24.346    USIMP(HKG) 0.007*** EXP_US 0.349***
(0.033) (0.009) (160) (0.002) (0.108)
JPNSGP 0.264*** JPNUS(SGP) 0.063*** FDISGP -31.852    USIMP(SGP) 0.017*** EXP_JPN 0.127   
(0.026) (0.010) (168) (0.003) (0.198)
JPNTHA 0.004    JPNUS(THA) 0.012    FDITHA -9.383    USIMP(THA) 0.007**  EXVOL_US 1,275.260   
(0.045) (0.010) (66) (0.003) (7,622)
JPNIDN 0.029    JPNUS(IDN) -0.020**  FDIIDN -17.233    USIMP(IDN) 0.008*** INF_THD 0.219   
(0.045) (0.009) (218) (0.002) (0.999)
JPNPHL 0.002    JPNUS(PHL) -0.083*** FDIPHL 96.418    USIMP(PHL) 0.031*** INF_US 1,377.510   
(0.088) (0.010) (273) (0.003) (1,469)
JPNMAL 0.441*** JPNUS(MAL) -0.041*** FDIMAL -588.633*** USIMP(MAL) 0.068*** NY_THD -0.001   
(0.037) (0.009) (182) (0.003) (0.004)
JPNCAN -1.899*** JPNUS(CAN) 0.024*** FDICAN 23.120    USIMP(CAN) 0.134*** NY_US 0.023   
(0.034) (0.007) (542) (0.002) (0.016)
JPNMEX 0.911*** JPNUS(MEX) -0.170*** FDIMEX 2,085.950*** USIMP(MEX) 0.113*** NY_JPN -0.002   
(0.080) (0.007) (454) (0.002) (0.003)
JPNBRA -0.092    JPNUS(BRA) -0.022*** FDIBRA -59.509    USIMP(BRA) 0.015*** TRADEINT2_US 8,419.060*  
(0.117) (0.006) (559) (0.002) (5,124)
JPNARG 0.009    JPNUS(ARG) -0.014    FDIARG -98.299    USIMP(ARG) 0.008*** TRADEINT2_JPN 600.325   
(0.452) (0.009) (3,708) (0.003) (4,103)
JPNFRA 0.032    JPNUS(FRA) -0.018*** FDIFRA -98.840    USIMP(FRA) 0.019*** IMP_WORLD_THD -0.003   
(0.072) (0.006) (410) (0.002) (0.027)
JPNGER 0.031    JPNUS(GER) 0.025*** FDIGER -274.517    USIMP(GER) 0.037*** IMP_WORLD_US -0.092   
(0.021) (0.006) (219) (0.002) (0.058)
JPNITA -0.076    JPNUS(ITA) -0.016**  FDIITA -158.597    USIMP(ITA) 0.020*** IMP_WORLD_JPN -0.011   
(0.095) (0.007) (779) (0.002) (0.040)
JPNUK 0.105*** JPNUS(UK) -0.038*** FDIUK -29.684    USIMP(UK) 0.043*** EXP_WORLD_THD 0.041   
(0.038) (0.007) (205) (0.002) (0.026)
EXP_WORLD_US -0.025   
(0.037)
EXP_WORLD_JPN 0.076   
(0.075)